

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0079/01 0491639
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 181608Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0177
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0092
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0091
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0095
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0091

S E C R E T GENEVA 000079

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18
TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP,
FEBRUARY 3, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY

REF: 10 MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-015.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: February 3, 2010

Time: 03:30 P.M. - 05:45 P.M.

Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) At the combined Inspection Protocol (IP) Working Group and Conversion or Elimination (Core) Working Group meeting chaired by Dr. Warner, Mr. Elliott, Colonel Ilin, and Colonel Ryzhkov, the sides discussed in detail the possible options associated with conducting elimination inspections. The sides discussed the U.S. proposal for conducting elimination inspections of ICBM silos and conversion inspections of SLBM launchers in conjunction with Type-1 inspections. Inspections of eliminated solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stages and eliminated mobile launchers would be Type-2 inspections. After discussion, the Russians presented a draft text that outlined their concept for conducting all conversion and

elimination inspections as Type-2 inspections. End summary.

14. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: One Meeting, Two Points of View; Confirming Conversions and Eliminations; The U.S. Approach; and The Russian Proposal.

ONE MEETING, TWO POINTS OF VIEW

15. (S) Warner re-stated the U.S. understanding of the agreement made in Moscow between General Jones (ret.) and Admiral Mullen on the U.S. side and General Makarov on the Russian side that 100 percent of the solid-fueled first stage rocket motors and mobile launchers of ICBMs eliminated in a given year would be inspected during two batch inspections (Reftel). Ilin claimed that this was incorrect and the agreement made in Moscow was that only 50 percent of the annual output of eliminated items would be subject to inspection. Ilin stated that clarification would be needed in order to create an effective process for confirmation of conversion or elimination. Both sides agreed the annual quotas for inspections would be ten for Type-1 and eight for Type-2.

CONFIRMING CONVERSIONS AND ELIMINATIONS

16. (S) Warner explained the preliminary U.S. view regarding the conduct of conversion or elimination (CorE) inspections was to confirm the elimination of silo launchers and converted SLBM launchers via inspections. He proposed that eliminated solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stages and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers would be confirmed during Type-2 inspections and be charged against the annual quota for these inspections.

17. (S) Ilin stated the Russian view was that all CorE inspections should be carried out as Type-2 inspections.

THE U.S. APPROACH

18. (S) Warner addressed the batching concept for both solid-fueled ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers. He proposed the estimated annual number of items to be eliminated be broken into four roughly equal groups or lots. These lots would be subject to inspection during each quarter of a year. When a batch was ready for inspection, the batch would be displayed in the open so that it was available for observation by National Technical Means (NTM) and a notification would be sent to the potential inspecting Party. No later than 72 hours prior to the expiration of the agreed inspection window, the inspecting Party would send the inspected Party notification whether or not it intended to inspect the accumulated lot of eliminated items. If the inspecting Party chose not to inspect the items, the eliminated first stages or mobile launchers could be removed from view of NTM at the expiration of the agreed display period. Warner noted that agreement would be needed on the time

available for viewing by NTM. (Begin comment: The U.S. position was that the display period in the open for eliminated items would be 60 days; the Russians proposed 30 days. End comment.) This process would be repeated for each batch, each quarter. This approach would also be applicable to inspect the results of the elimination of mobile ICBM launchers. This would mean that Part Five of the Protocol would be changed to allow up to four Type-2 inspections per year at each Core facility. Warner noted that, in theory, the United States could use all eight of its annual quota of Type-2 inspections at the two Core facilities, if it so desired.

¶9. (S) Ilin drew a diagram to illustrate what he understood as the U.S. position. He asked what would happen if unforeseen events

occurred and the number of items projected to be eliminated for the year changed. Warner stated there was room for flexibility. Ilin pointed out four inspections per year at one facility was two more than the maximum number for any one facility agreed to in Part Five of the Protocol. He also stated the U.S. approach would confirm 100 percent of the eliminated items each year while, in the Russian view, it had been agreed in Moscow that no more than 50 percent of the items eliminated in a year would be made available annually for inspection. Ilin asked if some first stage motor cases would have to spend more time on display for viewing by NTM than others. Warner replied that this was possible, but they could be stored indoors until the entire batch was ready for inspection and all moved out into the open at the same time. Ilin stated that it would be difficult to convince the Russian Delegation leadership to allow inspection of 100 percent of the eliminated items each year when the Mullen-Makarov meeting, in the Russian view, had concluded that inspection of up to 50 percent of the items eliminated in a single year would be sufficient. Warner re-emphasized that it was the understanding of the United States that up to 100 percent was the annual percentage of eliminated items that should be subject to inspection that was agreed in Moscow. Ilin stated that both working group chairs should bring the matter up to their respective heads of delegation for clarification.

¶10. (S) Warner countered that another possible option would be to limit to four the total number of inspections that might be conducted each year at the Russian Core facilities for solid-fueled ICBMs and for mobile ICBM launchers respectively. An inspecting Party could have the right to choose to go to one of the two Core facilities three times and the other only one time, or to inspect both facilities up to twice a year. Regardless, even if the total number of items inspected per year was less than 100 percent of the total projected output, the right to select what items would be inspected, and during which inspection period, would fall to the inspecting Party, not the inspected Party.

¶11. (S) Warner then described a third alternative, where the inspecting party would have the right to inspect no more than twice at each of the two Core facilities, but would still have the opportunity to select which of the four quarterly accumulated 'lots' within the year it wanted to inspect at each facility. The inspecting party could, of course, not choose to carry out the two inspections at each facility, opting instead to conduct only one inspection or none during the course of the year.

¶12. (S) Ilin countered that there was no parity with the United States for inspecting eliminated first stage motor cases; the United States would be eliminating few, if any, ICBMs and SLBMs, while Russia would be eliminating many ICBMs each year. Warner agreed, but noted that the United States would be converting heavy bombers from nuclear-equipped to conventional-only configuration and SLBM launchers, which would be available for Russian Core inspection, while Russia would not likely be converting any strategic systems. Additionally, Warner pointed out that most U.S.

strategic systems were in a different life cycle stage than Russian systems. This meant the United States would not be eliminating solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stages on a large scale. Ilin asked if the United States would provide an annual projection of

first stages to be eliminated. Warner assured him the United States would do so, though the number would be very small.

THE RUSSIAN PROPOSAL

¶13. (S) Ilin stated the U.S. proposal was logical and the Russian Delegation would like to see the U.S. proposal in writing. He explained that the Russian Delegation believed the U.S.-proposed process violated two red lines. First, it called for inspection of more than 50 percent of the items eliminated annually, a number which, in the Russian view, could not be exceeded. Second, the Parties could not exceed two inspections per year at each CorE facility.

¶14. (S) Warner asked Ilin to explain the Russian proposal. The basic premise of the Russian proposal was to provide for two inspections per year at the CorE facilities. During each potential inspection opportunity the inspecting Party would be offered 25 percent of the annual output of eliminated items. Warner stated that the United States had issues with having the opportunity to inspect only 50 percent of the number of items eliminated in a given year. The United States needed to have the opportunity to inspect 100 percent of eliminated items per year, even if it chose not to conduct an inspection for a specific batch of eliminated items. Ilin explained that the remaining 50 percent would be available for viewing by NTM. Elliot re-iterated the U.S. understanding that 100 percent of items should be available for on-site inspection.

¶15. (S) Ryzhkov stated that with four inspections per year at both of the Russian CorE facilities, the United States would have to use all eight Type-2 inspections available in a given year to confirm the elimination of 100 percent of eliminated items. Warner stated this was true, but if the United States chose to only inspect each facility two times per year the United States would only be seeing 50 percent of the annual total of eliminated items of both types. This would be acceptable since it was the inspecting Party's prerogative to not fully exercise its inspection rights.

¶16. (S) Warner stated that the U.S. Delegation would review the Russian proposed text and create a joint draft text incorporating both U.S. and Russian concepts. At the next working group meeting both parties would discuss it further.

¶17. (S) Ryzhkov suggested that it might be possible to agree to allow for 100 percent on-site inspection of eliminated items if the United States could agree to drop the requirement for making eliminated items available for viewing by NTM. Warner said he

would consider this alternative.

¶18. (U) Documents provided:

- Russia:

-- Russian draft of Part Five, Section VII (Type-2 Inspections).

¶19. (U) Participants:

UNITED STATES

Dr. Warner
Mr. Elliott
Mr. Ahlm
Mr. Albertson
Lt Col Goodman
Maj Johnson (RO)
LTC Litterini
Mr. McConnell
Ms. Purcell
Mr. Rust
LT Sicks
Mr. Smith
Ms. Gesse (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ilin
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Malyugin
Mr. Shevchenko

Mr. Smirnov
Ms. Vodolopova
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int)

¶20. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS